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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
UNITED STATES V. CALIFORNIA: WHO'S MINDING THE 
DAM? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. California,! the Ninth Circuit held that 
conditions imposed by the State of California on the impound-
ment of water for the United States Government's New Melones 
Dam Project were valid, since those conditions had not been 
shown to be inconsistent with congressional directives contained 
in the dam's authorizing legislation. 
The New Melones facility is a reclamation project on the 
Stanislaus River in California.2 In 1973, the United States Bu-
reau of Reclamation applied to the State Water Resources Con-
trol Board (State Board), as it does routinely pursuant to Cali-
fornia law,s to appropriate the water needed for impoundment 
1. 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Kennedy, J; the other panel members were 
Pregerson and Reinhardt, JJ.). 
2. [d. at 1173. The New Melones Project was designed to impound 2.4 million acre 
feet of water on California's Stanislaus River, for the multiple purposes of flood control, 
irrigation, power generation and recreation. [d. The project was authorized as part of the 
Central Valley Project, the largest water project yet approved under federal reclamation 
laws. [d. at 1172 n.1. 
3. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 652 (1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982). In California v. United States the court noted: 
Under California law, any person who wishes to appropriate 
water must apply for a permit from the State Water Resources 
Control Board. Cal. Water Code Ann. §§ 1201 and 1225 (West 
1971). The Board is to issue a permit only if it determines that 
unappropriated water is available and that the proposed use is 
both "reasonable" and "beneficial" and best services "the 
public interest." §§ 1240, 1255, and 1375, Cal. Const., Art. 10, 
§ 2 (West 1971). In deciding whether to issue a permit, the 
Board is to consider not only the planned use of the water but 
also alternative uses, including enhancement of water quality, 
recreation, and the preservation of fish and wildlife. Cal. 
Water Code §§ 1242.5, 1243, 1257 (West 1971). The Board can 
also impose such conditions in the permit as are necessary to 
insure the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use of the water and 
to protect "the public interest." §§ 1253 and 1391 (West 1971). 
139 
1
Ackley: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
140 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:139 
in the dam. After lengthy hearings, the State Board approved 
the application;' but attached twenty-five terms and conditions 
to the appropriation permit. Ii The State Board based its decision 
on the failure of the United States to demonstrate a current 
need for the water, and on the projected destruction of recrea-
tional uses and environmental quality resulting from full 
impoundment.6 
The most controversial state-imposed restriction provided 
that no water could be appropriated solely for the purpose of 
power generation,7 effectively delaying additional diversions un-
til needed for irrigation uses. The conditions also required that 
the New Melones project meet California's water quality stan-
dards, and mandated that the project abide by the county of 
Id. at 653 n.7. 
4. Decision 1422, CAL. WATER RESOURCES CENTROL BOARD (Apr. 4, 1973). 
5. The most important condition prohibited full impoundment of water until the 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation was able to show firm commitments, or at least a specific 
plan, for the use of the water. Other conditions prohibited collection of water during 
periods of the year when unappropriated water is available; required that a preference be 
given to water users in the water basin in which the New Melones Project is located 
(referred to as the 'country of origin preference') required storage releases to be made so 
as to maintain maximum and minimum chemical concentrations in the San Joaquin 
River and protect fish and wildlife; required the United States to provide means for the 
release of excess waters and to clear vegetation and structures from the reservoir sites; 
required the filing of additional reports and studies; and provide for access to the project 
site by the State Board and the public. Additional conditions reserved jurisdiction to the 
Board to impose further conditions on the appropriations if necessary to protect the 
"beneficial use" of the water involved. Id. at 28-37. 
6. The State Board found that white water rafting, stream fishing, and wildlife up-
stream from the dam would be harmed by the higher water levels. The State Board 
stated: 
Id. at 18-27. 
The public interest requires that the use of Stanislaus 
River for whitewater boating, stream fishing and wildlife 
habitat be protected to the extent that water is not needed for 
other beneficial uses. Therefore, although there is a demon-
strated need for the full yield of the project in the four basin 
counties at some time in the future, but for which no contracts 
have been negotiated, and in view of the adverse effect the 
proposed reservior will have upon these recreational uses, im-
poundment of water to satisfy that need should not be permit-
ted at this time. Instead, the Board should retain jurisdiction 
over the permits for the purpose of approving incremental ap-
propriations for consumptive use up to the quantities covered 
by the applications when the need for the water is 
substantiated. 
7. See supra note 5. 
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origin preference8 in California water law. In addition, the condi-
tions provided for continuing State Board authority over the 
project.8 
In 1973, the United States brought suit against the State of 
California, challenging the conditions attached to the permit for 
the New Melones project. IO Seeking a declaratory judgment, the 
United States contended that California lacked authority to im-
pose any condition on the acquisition and use of water, provided 
water was available for the facility.ll The United States argued 
that all power and control over reclamation projects was given to 
the federal government under the Reclamation Act of 1902,12 
and that California's role was limited to determining whether 
sufficient water was available for the project.13 The district court 
agreed with the United States and entered a declaratory judg-
ment to that effect. 14 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed with modifications. II! The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, 
holding that the permit conditions were valid as long as they 
were not "inconsistent with congressional directives as to the 
New Melones Dam."IB On remand, the district court determined 
that all of the conditions except for those prohibiting the appro-
priation of water for power operationI7 were consistent with the 
relevant congressional directives. I8 On appeal,I8 the United 
8. See supra note 5. 
9. See supra note 5. 
10. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975). 
11. [d. at 874. 
12. Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390 
(current version at 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976)). 
13. 403 F. Supp. at 883. 
14. [d. at 902-03. 
15. United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347, 1352-54 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wallace, 
C.J., concurring and dissenting). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but held that § 8 of the 
1902 Reclamation Act, rather than providing for comity, requires the United States to 
apply for a permit. 
16. 438 U.S. at 679. 
17. See supra note 5. 
18. 509 F. Supp. at 85-87. Relevant congressional directives were found to include 
the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 10, 58 Stat. 887, 901, 
and the Flood Control Act of October 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203,76 Stat. 1173, 
1191. 
19. Both the State of California and the United States appealed the district court 
decision. 694 F.2d at 1174. 
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States sought to invalidate all of the conditions, asserting they 
were inconsistent with congressional intent.2o California con-
tended that the condition prohibiting diversion for power gener-
ation purposes was consistent with "explicit" congressional 
directives.21 
B. BACKGROUND 
Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act provides that state law 
will govern in the appropriation, use or distribution of irrigation 
water for federal reclamation projects.22 In early decisions inter-
preting section 8, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
broad state control over the water.23 With the expansion of fed-
eral reclamation policies through subsequent legislation,24 how-
ever, the Supreme Court departed from its earlier direction.:&li 
The legislation authorizing the New Melones facility expressly 
incorporated the 1902 Reclamation Act, including section 8.28 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 1175. 
22. The Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8, supra note 12, 32 Stat. at 390, provides: 
[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or in-
tended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any 
States or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use 
or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested rights 
acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in car-
rying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conform-
ity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect 
any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any 
landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to or from any 
interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the 
right to use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act 
shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use 
shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right. 
[d. 32 Stat. at 390. 
23. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 
(1935); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
24. See, e.g., Act of February 21, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-406, 36 Stat. 925 (extending 
the time period within which construction charges could be repaid to the reclamation 
fund by users of project water, and investing the Secretary with broad discretion to act 
"as he may designate" in administering the Act (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 418 
(1976»; Act of February 25, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-147, 41 Stat. 451 (amending the recla-
mation laws to authorize the Secretary to enter into contracts for non-irrigation purposes 
"upon such conditions of delivery, use and payment as he may deem proper") (current 
version at 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1976». See Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation 
Law, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 82-83 (1964). 
25. See Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); City of 
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
26. The New Melones Dam was authorized by the Flood Control Act of December 
22,1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 10,58 Stat. 887,901, and the Flood Control Act of Octo-
4
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Prior to California v. United States,27 no decisions had ad-
dressed directly the validity of permit conditions imposed by a 
state pursuant to section 8, although seven Supreme Court cases 
had indirectly dealt with this issue.28 In Kansas v. Colorado,29 
the United States Supreme Court suggested, in dicta, that the 
federal government may lack constitutional authority to acquire 
water for its reclamation projects without following state law. so 
In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress does have authority to preempt state law in the manage-
ment of federal reclamation projects.S1 Since the constitutional-
ity of federal reclamation law has been firmly established, the 
degree of deference to state law required now becomes a matter 
of interpreting the federal reclamation statutes. S2 
Shortly after Kansas, the Supreme Court decided Nebraska 
v. Wyom'ing. ss In the first Nebraskas4 opinion, issued in 1935, 
the Court stated, in dicta, that under section 8 the United States 
"must obtain permits and priorities for the use of the water" 
from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as any other 
private appropriator or irrigation district. SII In a second N e-
ber 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1191. As in the case of all other 
reclamation projects, Congress specifically directed that the dam be operated and main· 
tained "pursuant to the Federal reclamation laws." Flood Control Act of 1962 § 203, 76 
Stat. at 1191. 
27. 438 U.S. 645. 
28. Only seven Supreme Court cases had even mentioned § 8. The cases were Kan· 
sas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497 (1924); Nebraska 
v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 (1935); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); United 
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. Mc-
Cracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Arizona 
v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). ' 
29. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
30. Id. at 85-94. 
31. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 291-92; Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630; Arizona, 373 U.S. at 586. 
32. See, e,g., Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 277 -300 (interpreting the Reclamation Act of 1902 
§§ 5 & 8, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. at 389-90); Fresno, 372 U.S. at 629-632 (interpret-
ing the Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8, 32 Stat. at 390, and the Reclamation Project Act of 
1939 § 9(c), 43 U.S.C. § 485h (Supp. 1981»; Arizona, 373 U.S. at 586-88 (interpreting the 
Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8,32 Stat. at 390, and the Boulder Canyon Project Act §§ 1-
21,43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1928). 
33. 295 U.S. 40 (1935); 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
34. 295 U.S. 40 (1935). 
35. Id. at 42-43. The 1935 Nebraska opinion decided only a procedural issue. The 
United States Supreme Court determined that the United States was not an indispensa-
ble party to the suit brought by Nebraska against the State of Wyoming for equitable 
apportionment of the waters of the North Platte River. Id. 
5
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braska36 opinion decided ten years later, the Court explained 
that its decision to apportion the water to the states, rather than 
the federal government, did not imply state control over federal 
projects.37 The Court indicated that the United States had com-
plied with the congressional directive in section 8 by acquiring 
its water pursuant to state law,38 but cautioned, "[W]e do not 
suggest that where Congress has provided a system of regulation 
fOJ: federal projects," it must give way before an inconsistent 
state system.39 
In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,"o the Supreme 
Court ruled that section 8 did not authorize a state to override 
section 5 of the Reclamation Act. U Section 5 provides that dis-
tribution of water from federal projects is limited to holdings of 
160 acres or less.,,:a Earlier in the Ivanhoe litigation, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found the section 5 acreage limitation con-
trary to state law.43 The United States Supreme Court, in hold-
ing that California must adhere to the section 5 acreage 
limitation, stated that Congress did not intend the "specific and 
mandatory" provision of section 5, which "has represented na-
tional policy for over half a century," to be overriden by section 
8."· The Court, in dictum, noted that section 8 requires compli-
36. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
37. [d. at 615-16. 
38. [d. at 612. 
39. [d. at 615. 
40. 357 U.S. at 275. 
41. [d. at 291-92. The Reclamation Act of 1902 § 5, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388, 
389 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 423e (1970», provides in pertinent part: 
[NJo right to the use of water for land in private ownership 
shall be sold for tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres 
to anyone landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any 
landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such 
land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said 
land, and no such right shall permanently attach until all pay-
ments therefore are made. 
[d. 32 Stat. at 389. 
42. 357 U.S. at 291. 
43. [d. at 289-90. The Supreme Court of California had found that § 5 would be 
contrary to the State's trust obligation as embodied in CAL. WATER CODE § 22250 be-
cause it would discriminate against owners of parcels exceeding 160 acres. Ivanhoe Irriga-
tion District v. All Parties, 47 C.2d 597, 636; 306 P.2d 824, 847 (1957). See CAL. WATER 
CODE § 22250 (providing for ratable distribution of water among landowners). 
44. 357 U.S. at 291-93. The Court stated: . 
With respect to the Central Valley Project the Congress has 
again and again reaffirmed the specific requirements of § 5 
6
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ance with state law when the United.States acquires water, but 
not when it delivers water.4Ii 
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ivanhoe 
dictum in City of Fresno v. California.46 In Fresno, the Court 
held that the United States was authorized under the Reclama-
tion Act to acquire private water rights through condemnation, 
notwithstanding. state laws restricting condemnation of the 
rights.47 The Court ruled that section 8 only required compli-
ance w:th state law in defining the property interests for which 
compensation must be paid.48 Accordingly, state law was held 
not to apply even in the acquisition of water, where such acqui-
sition was through condemnation.49 
In Arizona v. California,60 California asked the Court to 
hold that state law would control in the distribution of water 
from the Boulder Canyon Project, a massive multistate reclama-
tion facility on the Colorado River. The Court rejected the 
state's claim after reviewing the legislative history of the Boul-
der Canyon Project Act,61 which incorporates section 8, and con-
cluded that because of the unique size and multistate scope of 
the project, Congress did not intend for the states to interfere 
with the distribution of the water. 62 The Court indicated that 
the "varying, possibly inconsistent, commands of different state 
legislatures" could frustrate efficient operation of the project 
and the action taken by the Secretary thereunder. As late 89 
19~ on consideration of the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Bill 
the Senate refused, after vigorous debate, to concur in a con-
ference report that would have exempted this project from the 
exceSs land requirements of § 5. 90 CONGo REC:9493-9499. 
Id. at 292-93. 
45. 357 U.S. at 291-92. The Ivanhoe dictum has been critized 89 contrary to the 
extensive legislative history supporting state regulatory control over project water. See 
Walston, Reborn Federalism in Western Water Law: The New Melones Dam Decision, 
30 HASTINGS L. J. 1645, 1668 (1979). 
46. 372 U.S. at 632. 
47. Id. at 630. The state laws provided for, first, a priority for water users in the 
county and watershed where the water originates. Id. at 628 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 
1460, 11460, 11463 (West 1971»; The Court noted that the first state law, providing for a 
priority of municipal over agricultural uses, is directly contrary to priorities contained in 
the federal reclamation laws. Id. at 630 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976». 
48. 372 U.S. at 630. 
49.Id. 
50. 373 U.S. 546. 
51. Boulder Canyon Project Act §§ 1-21,43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1928). 
52. 373 U.S. at 588. 
7
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and that a unitary system of management was necessary. liS In 
Arizona, the United States Supreme Court left open, however, 
the question whether state control of a single-state project 
would be permissible. 
More recent Supreme Court decisions, although not decided 
under the Reclamation Act, have failed to find expressions of 
legislative intent sufficient to bind federal facilities under state 
permitting systems governing air and water quality control. M In 
Hancock v. Trainlili and United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency v. California,li8 the Supreme Court held that the 
states lack authority to require the federal government to seek 
permits for federal facilities. The Court ruled that the states 
cannot regulate federal activities in any way in the absence of 
"clear and unambiguous" congressional authorization. Ii? 
In California v. United States, the Supreme Court, follow-
ing a thorough examination of the legislative history surround-
ing the 1902 Reclamation Act and the post-1902 federal admin-
istrative practice of following state laws, overruled the dicta in 
Ivanhoe, Fresno and Arizona. The Court held that section 8 re-
quires the United States to comply with st~te laws governing the 
appropriation and distribution of water when such laws condi-
tion the use of water, provided the· conditions are not inconsis-
tent with congressional directives. liS The decision, however, did 
not define what type of congressional directives would be suffi-
cient to override state law, presumably intending that the lower 
courts would create a workable standard. li9 
C. ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
In United States v. California, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the state permit conditions were not shown to be 
53. Id. at 590. 
54. In Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), the Court held that federal facilities 
were not required to comply with state permit programs under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 
198. Similarly, in EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), the Court held that federal 
facilities need not apply for state permits pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act. [d. at 211. 
55. 426 U.S. at 198. 
56. 426 U.S. at 227. 
57. 426 U.S. at 180; 426 U.S. at 214. 
58. 438 U.S. at 674. 
59. [d. at 653-70. 
8
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inconsistent with the "congressional directives" contained in the 
authorizing legislation for the New Melones Dam.80 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court decision in California 
v. United States required the United States to comply with 
state water law absent a preempting federal statute.81 The Court 
rejected California's contention that congressional intent to pre-
empt state law must be explicit. California had argued that only 
provisions such as the federal I60-acre limitation at issue in 
Ivanhoe, and the preference for irrigation use over municipal use 
discuss~d in Fresno were sufficiently explicit to preempt incon-
sistent state laws.82 Instead, the court adopted the position that 
the state permit conditions were valid unless shown to clash 
"with express or clearly implied congressional intent or to work 
at cross-purposes with an important federal interest served by 
the congressional scheme. "83 
In· analyzing the specific permit conditions, the court con-
ceded that the condition deferring the impoundment of water 
for irrigation and other consumptive uses was "capable of broad 
construction" and ·that California "might never" allow full use of 
the dam." The court, however, was satisfied with California's 
narrow interpretation of the provision,81i and concluded that the 
provision could be reconciled with congressional intent.88 The 
panel noted that the beneficial use requirement contained in the 
provisions mirrored the beneficial use standard contained in sec-
tion 8.87 The court determined that California could require the 
United States to show it had customers who needed the water 
before sacrificing the upstream recreational, scenic and wildlife 
uses.88 
The court rejected the United States' assertion that Con-
gress had already determined the beneficial use issue, and that 
the failure to fill a federally funded project to capacity is inher-
60. 694 F.2d at 1182. 
61. [d. at 1176. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. at 1177. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 1177-78. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. 
9
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ently inconsistent with congressional intent.69 The court charac-
terized the State Board's action on the permit application as de-
ferring rather than prohibiting full impoundment.7o Accordingly, 
the court expressly rejected the United States' argument that 
"the power to defer is the power to prevent."71 
The court next stated that the precepts of federalism re-
flected in the congressional scheme and in the Supreme Court's 
earlier decision demonstrate a preference for negotiation rather 
than litigation.72 The panel, in disapproving the United States' 
posture, stated that the United States' demands may not be jus-
tified as a "raw exercise of superior authority."73 Citing the com-
peting interests involved and the existence of alternative benefi-
cial uses for the water, 74 the court emphasized that at a 
minimum, the United States has an obligation to make a full 
showing of the benefits anticipated from the operation of the 
dam at full capacity.711 
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the power generation ben-
efits of the project, which were deferred under the permit until 
the water was needed for irrigation or other consumptive uses.7S 
The court concluded that the United States had failed to 
demonstrate a need to impound water for power purposes only." 
Further, the court noted that .in a prior case78 challenging the 
adequacy of the environmental impact statement on the New 
Melones project the United States had argued that the impact of . 
the permit conditions on the project was relatively slight and 
that only a deferral of full project benefits would result.79 While 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at 1179. 
77. [d. 
78. The prior case was Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974). 
79. 694 F.2d at 1179. The court stated: 
We note that in Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 
487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974, 94 
S.Ct. 2002, 40 L.Ed.2d 564 (1974), the United States advised 
the Supreme Court as follows: 
[EJven if the State Board's decision 1422 is found to be 
10
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the court did not find that the United States was estopped from 
asserting a contrary position in United States v. California, the 
court found the prior statement to be a significant admission.so 
The Ninth Circuit next analyzed the permit conditions re-
quiring adherence to· both California water quality standards 
and to the county of origin allocation preference. SI The court 
noted that the 1962 enabling legislation contained provisions al-
most identical to those two conditions,82 indicating that the per-
mit conditions could have been imposed by the federal agencies 
involved.ss The court concluded that the permit conditions facil-
itate, rather than frustrate, congressional intent. S4 
The court rejected as inconsistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's earlier decision the United States' contention 
that the conditions were invalid because Congress intended fed-
eral agencies, rather than the state, to make permit decisions. S& 
The court concluded that the conditions must be upheld, absent 
a showing that th.ey would frustrate the attainment of federal 
goals.ss 
The court did not address the validity of many of the per-
mit conditions on grounds that a decision on the issue would be 
premature.87 The court stated that the parties' actions would de-
termine the· meaning of the conditions and their consistency 
Id. 
binding on the federal agencies, its only effect would be 
to defer slightly the full conservation yield of the pro-
ject. Most of the project purposes were permitted by 
the Board's decision. The decision does not render the 
project useless or fundamently alter its value. 
Def. Exh. 7 at 9. 
80. 694 F.2d at 1179. 
81. Id. at 1180-81. 
82. Id. The two key provisions give priority to water needs within the Stanislaus 
River Basin before water is exported for use outside the basin; the 1962 Flood Control 
Act also provides for the preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife, provides for 
the generation of electrical energy, and the maintenance of downstream water quality 
control. Act of October 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203,76 Stat. 1173, 1191-92. 
83. 694 F.2d at 1180-81. 
84. Id. at 1181. 
85.Id .. 
86.Id. 
87.Id. 
11
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with the 1962 statute.88 The panel noted that the conditions re-
serving State Board authority over the water permit, for exam-
ple, could be exercised inconsistently with congressional intent.89 
The court, however, expressly declined to decide the validity of 
any "hypothetical action" to be taken by the state pursuant to 
the reserved power conditions, relying on "cooperative federal-
ism" to prevent the issue from being presented for 
adjudication.90 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit relied on a preemption standard to deter-
mine that the conditions imposed by California on the distribu-
tion of water from the federal government's New Melones Dam 
Project were valid. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit was pur-
portedly applying the standard enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court, prior to remand, that state conditions "not in-
consistent with congressional directives" would stand. The court 
stated that, under California v. United States, a state condition 
is valid "unless it clashes with express or clearly implied con-
gressional intent or works at cross-purposes with an important 
federal interest served by the congressional scheme. "91 While the 
result reached in the Ninth Circuit decision appears entirely 
consistent with the direction indicated by the Supreme Court, 
the Ninth Circuit's preemption approach does not comport with 
the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court upon remand to 
the lower federal courts. 
In its ground breaking California v. United States decision, 
the Supreme Court determined that, under section 8 of the 1902 
Reclamation Act, state law controls in the distribution of project 
[d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 1182. The court stated: 
90. [d. 
The New Melones project is intended to be operated by fed-
eral officials in pursuance of certain declared goals. California 
cannot impose burdensome conditions which were not contem-
plated by Congress, or which would work against the achieve-
ment of the project's goals. For example, once the federal gov-
ernment has made binding contracts for delivery of water, 
California would be more restricted than it was when it origi-
nally regulated impoundment and distribution of water. 
91. [d. at 1177. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/8
1984] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 151 
water. In the decision, which overruled dicta threatening to 
erode the states' role· in reclamation project management, the 
Supreme Court noted the long history of "purposeful and con-
tinued deference to state water law by Congress,"92 and held 
that state law controls, absent more specific language to the con-
trary in subsequent legislation. The Supreme Court standard 
thus posed a questiot;l of statutory construction. By virtue of sec-
tion 8, Congress has expressly deferred to state law, directing 
federal agencies to "proceed in conformity with"93 state laws in 
the "control, appropriation, use or distribution"H of water from 
federal reclamation facilities. Where the issue before the court is 
one of determining the scope of state authority in an area ex-
pressly delegated to state control, rather than one of accommo-
dation between conflicting state and federal regulations, the pre-
emption doctrine has no application. In the present case, 
however, the distinction was without significance since the 
Ninth Circuit failed to find any congressional directives in con-
flict with state law. . 
While considerable uncertainty arises out of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's failure to articulate a standard for analyzing state permit 
conditions in future litigation, the lack of clarity is outweighed 
by considerations of fairness. The case by case approach exem-
plified in this decision will lead to a balanced accommodation 
between federal and state interests. Important federal interests 
expressed in legislation authorizing specific reclamation projects 
will still be protected. And state concerns, as reflected in the 
conditions attached to the project permit, will be upheld pro-
vided they do not conflict with the federal enabling legislation. 
However, the state of law as it relates to the validity of the re-
maining state water permit conditions may depend on political 
considerations and the zeal federal interests exhibit for litigating 
additional state-imposed permit restrictions. 
The Ninth Circuit decision appears, at first blush, to be an 
endorsement of state control of reclamation project water. Yet, 
in alluding to a possible limit on state control, the court speaks 
in terms contrary to the strong language of deference articulated 
92. 438 u.s. at 653. 
93. See supra note 2? 
94. See supra note 22. 
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by the Supreme Court in California v. United States. The 
Ninth Circuit suggests that once the federal government has 
contracted to sell the water, California would be constrained in 
its authority to regulate, notwithstanding state conditions re-
serving authority over the permit. However, there is nothing in 
California v. United States assigning any particular significance 
to the time of contracting or indicating that the state conditions 
would not be permitted to influence in some \yay the "opera-
tion" of the dam. Although dicta, the Ninth Circuit language 
limiting state control is disturbing to the extent that it may be 
relied on in subsequent challenges to state permit conditions. 
The court expressly declines to rule on the reserved power con-
ditions, urging that "a spirit of cooperative federalism" on both 
sides aid the resulotion of future conflicts in the operation of the 
New Melones Dam. Thus, the Ninth Circuit decision succeeds 
only in clouding the question of the validity of the conditions 
reserving state authority over the permit, while ultimately refus-
ing to decide the issue. 
Nonetheless, despite its flawed application of the Supreme 
Court standard and some troublesome dicta, the result reached 
by the Ninth Circuit is correct. The decision, consistent with the 
Supreme Court's direction in California v. United States, prop-
erly achieves a restoration of the important policy of deference 
to state law reflected in the earlier case law interpretation of sec-
tion 8. Section 8 is a product of the historic federal tradition 
that recognized the states as the source of water rights in the 
west.911 Since 1902, Congress has continually reaffirmed its ac-
knowledgment that water management appropriately rests with 
95. Senator Clark of Wyoming, one of the principal supporters of the original recla-
mation bill in the Senate, explained in the debate over the legislation: 
[I]t is right and proper that the various States and Territories 
should control in the distribution. The conditions in each and 
every State and Territory are different. What would be appli-
cable in one locality is totally and absolutely inapplicable in 
another .... In each and every one of the States and Territo-
ries affected, after a long series of experiments, after a due 
consideration of conditions, there has arisen a set of men who 
are especially qualified to deal with local conditions. 
Everyone of these States and Territories has an accom-
plished and experienced corps of engineers who for years have 
devoted their energies and their learning to a solution of this 
problem of irrigation in their individual localities. 
438 U.S. at 667 (citing 35 CONGo REC. 2222 (1902». 
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state agencies.,e California, like most western states,''1 has re-
sponded by developing a permit allocation system which pro-
motes the maximum beneficial use of scarce water resources.'S 
The western states' administrative programs routinely involved 
the imposition of permit conditions on water users. The permit-
ting schemes employed by the states to manage their water re-
sources represent an efficient implementation of the authority 
vested in them by virtue of section 8 and subsequent legislation. 
96. Recent legislation, in establishing a "national policy" to protect the environ· 
ment, provides that the states shall bear the primary responsibility for implementing the 
policy. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.G. §§ 4321,4332 
(1976); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4371(b)(1976). See 
Walston, supra note 45 at 1678. Several other recent laws allow the states to exercise 
substantial authority in matters affecting national policy: 
For instance, the Clean Water Act of 1972 authorizes the 
states to adopt permit systems for the control of water pollu-
tion and to apply their permit systems to federal agencies. See 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, 1323 (West Supp. 1978). The Clean 
Air Act of 1977 similarly authorizes states to adopt implemen-
tation plans for the control of air pollution and to apply their 
plans to federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, 7418 
(West Supp. 1978). The Deepwater Ports Act of 1975, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976), gives the U.S. Department of 
Transportation authority to license deepwater ports, but gives 
the states a veto power over the licensing of such ports. [d. §§ 
1503(c) (9) - (10), 1508. The Coastal Zone Managment Act of 
1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976), encourages the states to 
develop management plans for the protection of their coastal 
areas, and provides that the plans must follow guidelines set 
forth in the Act and must be federally approved; federal agen-
cies are required to comply with such plans "to the maximum 
extent practicable." [d. § 1456(c) (1) - (2). 
Walston, supra note 45 at 1645 n.1. 
97. Walston notes: 
Of the nineteen western states, all but three require an appro-
priator of surface water to obtain an appropriative permit 
from the state. 1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the 
Nineteen Western States 302 (1974). The exceptions are Ha-
waii, Colorado and Montana. Hawaii, which is not an arid 
state, does not recognize the appropriation doctrine. Colorado 
and Montana have judicial rather than administrative systems 
for statutory adjudications of appropriative rights. Montana 
additionally provides that such rights can be acquired by post-
ing of notice and filing of records. 
Walston, supra note 45 at 1652 n.21. 
98. See supra note 3. 
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These state water management systems should not be disturbed 
absent a strong showing of conflict with federal legislation. 
Linda Ackley* 
• Golden Gate School of Law, Class of 1984 
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